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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Liability Of Principal For Automobile Accident Of
Agent On Personal Business
Mider v. United States'
Defendant's agent, a motor pool sergeant, was left in
charge of an Air Force motor pool in the absence of his
superiors. While in charge, he authorized and executed a
dispatch voucher, assigning the vehicle in question to
himself. Several hours later, after partaking of intoxicants,
the sergeant collided with the vehicle of the plaintiff,
fifty five miles from the base. At the time of the accident
the agent was a passenger; another enlisted man was
driving. The plaintiff instituted this action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act2 to recover for damages caused
by a collision with the automobile of the defendant. The
court, finding it unnecessary to decide the relationship of
the parties at the time of the accident,3 found the defend-
ant, United States, to be negligent in the dispatch of the
vehicle4 under the circumstances prevailing, and thus
liable for the damages resulting from the accident which,
the court said, were forseeable.
Why they so ruled in unclear. This holding could have
been the result of: (1) charging the United States with the
negligence of the agent or driver at the time of the accident
by the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) finding the
defendant primarily negligent in placing this particular
agent in a position to control the dispatching of the car.
The Court stated that the sergeant was "vested with
apparent authority to dispatch vehicles under the existing
conditions. . . ."I It is difficult to see that apparent au-
1201 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
'28 U.S.C., §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1958). § 1346(b) states in part:
"[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, .
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United -States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance wflh the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred."
[ "IT]his situation squarely raises a factual question as to whether the
operator of its [defendant's] vehicle was acting within the scope ;of
defendant's employment, and if not, whether the defendant has been
otherwise guilty of negligence through its servants, which cause it to be
liable. In our view of the case, it is unnecessary to here decide whether
the driver was acting within the scope of employment at the time of
the accident because we feel that the case can be disposed of on the
basis of the circumstances bf the dispatching of the vehicle." 201 F.
Supp. 844, 845 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
'Ibid.5Ibid.
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thority has any relevance to the problem. A determination
of liability under the doctrine of apparent authority re-
quires: (1) a showing that a principal has allowed another
to appear to be his agent; (2) that a third party has
reasonably relied on the supposed authority of the agent;
and (3) that a party has suffered a loss as a result of this
reliance.6 In the dispatch of the vehicle in question, the
agent dealt exclusively with himself as a third party. In
order to satisfy the above criterion of apparent authority7
under the facts of this case one must find some relevant
manifestation of authority by the defendant. Certainly the
plaintiff in no sense relied on manifestations of the United
States. The court could hardly treat the motor pool ser-
geant in his capacity as the transferee of the car as
relying justifiably and in good faith upon the supposed
authority of himself as transferror. At any rate, the ser-
geant suffered no harm as a result of any reliance that
might have been present.
The application of the doctrine of apparent authority
was originally believed possible only where the liability
was based on a contract made by the agent.' The applica-
tion of this theory to the tort area was announced in
Hannon v. Seigel-Cooper Co.9 In that case, the defendnat
department store advertised that it had available dental
services at its store. In a suit to recover damages for
injuries sustained from these services the defendant was
estopped from denying liability for the conduct of one
whom they held out as their agent, ° despite the fact that
the dentist was an independent contractor. In Santise v.
Martins, Inc.," a customer sued a department store, which
had an independently operated shoe department, for in-
jury received from a nail protruding from the sole of a
shoe tried on by the plaintiff. It was held that the holding
out of control and ownership by the defendant, could, upon
an adequate showing of reliance, support recovery. There
are many other illustrations of tort liability of the principal
for the negligence of the agent under this apparent au-
thority rationale. 2 In all cases, the manifestation of au-
'Abuc Trading & Sales Corp. v. Jennings, 151 Md. 392, 411, 135 A. 166
(1926) ; 2 Am. Jun. 82-85, Agency, §§ 101-103; RESTATEMFNT, AGFNCY (2d
ed. 1958) § 265, p. 575.
" Ibid.
8 Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co., 303 Mass. 540, 22 N.E. 2d 76 (1939).
9167 N.Y. 244, 60 N.E. 597 (1901).
10 For purpose of clarity and continuity within this note the terminology
of the RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, 2d will be used throughout.
11 17 N.Y.S. 2d 741 (1940).
12Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N.H. 167, 5 A. 2d 667 (1939); Combs v.
Kobacker Stores, Inc., 114 N.E. 2d 447 (Ohio 1953) ; Augusta Friedman's
Shop, Inc. v. Yeates, 216 Ala. 434, 113 So. 299 (1927).
1963]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
thority, justifiably relied upon by the plaintiff with the
injury incurring as a direct result thereof, is the basis for the
action.' 3 The Restatement of Agency 4 adopts the view
that the master is not subject to liability for the torts of
his servant when committed outside the scope of employ-
ment except where the servant purported to act on behalf
of the master and the injured party justifiably relied on
the apparent authority. The effect of the agent's acting
within the scope of his employment or his apparent au-
thority is of no consequence if the third person has not in
some way justifiably relied upon the agency relationship. 5
To illustrate this point the Restatement uses the following
example:
"P permits A to appear as his servant and A is gen-
erally known as such. While A is driving upon his own
affairs but ostensibly upon P's affair, he negligently
runs over T, who believes A to be P's servant. P is
not thereby liable to T.' 16
Certainly in the Mider case, the plaintiff in no way relied
on any manifestations of agency; indeed, the plaintiff could
not have been aware of the principal-agent relationship at
the time of the accident, and this would seem to preclude
any recourse to the apparent authority recovery.
As a further finding of fact, the Court stated that the
agent "was acting within the scope of his employment"' 7
in ordering the dispatch in question. Conduct of a serv-
ant is within the scope of his employment if it is the
type of duty he is employed to perform and if it is actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. 8 The
substantive intent of the servant is controlling, his ex-
ternal manifestations being only of evidentiary value.'9
The dispatch of the vehicle in question was apparently
for personal purposes and not in any way connected with
serving the defendant.20
13 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 2d § 267, p. 578.
- Id., § 219.
- Id., § 265(2).
21 Id., § 265, Illustration 3.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1958)
"'Acting within the scope of his office or employment', in the case
of a member of the military or naval forces of the United States,
means acting in the line of duty."
" RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 2d § 228(1).
"Id., § 235, comment a.
"The evidence disclosed a visit to a private residence, and partaking
of intoxicants by both driver and passenger. The collision occurred some
55 miles from the base. Supra, n. 1, 845.
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Comment d to Section 241 of the Restatement of
Agency, 2d Ed. states:
"If the servant surrenders custody of an instrumen-
tality in order that a private purpose of his own or of
the one to whom he gives the custody can be accom-
plished by its use, the master is not liable for subse-
quent injuries .. "21
The need to establish that the servant was, in fact, acting
in the furtherance of his master's business would seem
to rest upon the policy behind the doctrine of respondeat
superior, i.e., the control, exercisable by the master over
the servant while doing his work, and an allocation to
business of the risks normally attendant thereto.22 The
conduct of the servant when not acting for the master is
not an incident of the business risks of the master, and
indeed, the servant is as much a stranger to the master
as he is to the third person.2 3 This result is justified by the
fact that there is no element of control exercised by the
master over the servant during this time.
In Penas v. Chicago, M & St. P.R. Co.,24 the court recog-
nized the fact that the language of the law of master and
servant is burdened with artificiality, equivocation, con-
tradiction, misnomers and widespread confusion. The
inter-relation of the issues and theories herein seems to be
an example.
The car in question, at the time of the accident, was
being operated in such a manner that personal liability on
the part of the operator was readily apparent; indeed it
was stipulated.25
The question of liability of the United States which is
based on the negligence of the sergeant or the driver should
have been decided in favor of the United States. The
agent was in no way acting for the principal, nor was he
holding himself out as an agent to the plaintiff, and no
reliance on the part of the plaintiff at the time of the
accident was found.
2 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 2d § 241 reads:
"A master who has entrusted a servant with an instrumentality is
subject to liability for harm caused by its negligent management by
one to whom the servant entrusts its custody to do the work the
servant was employed to perform, if the servant should realize that
there is an undue risk that such person will harm others by its
management."
MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, § 359, p. 242 (4th ed.
1952).
'Nelson Business College Co. v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N.E. 471(1899).
112 Minn. 203, 127 N.W. 926 (1910).
2 2 0 1 F. Supp. 844, 845 (1961).
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The primary negligence on the part of the master, the
second probable ground for the holding in this case, might
be based upon the theory that the master was negligent in
placing this agent in a position where he could directly
control the car in question. However, in Bradley v.
Stevens,0 where an employee of the defendant assaulted
the plaintiff, the court held that the defendant had not
been negligent in failing to learn the character and repu-
tation of the employee. It found that unless the employee
is acting within the scope of his master's business the
master will not be responsible for the tort of the servant,
and the only recourse available to the plaintiff is to prove
the master negligent in the hiring of the servant.
The master may be deemed negligent where he is put
on notice of the likelihood of misconduct of the servant
by either personal observation or facts within the com-
pany records.2 There is no indication in the Mider opinion
of prior misconduct of the servant, nor of any reason why
the master should have been put on notice of the past
history of the servant.
The standard of care to be exercised by the defendant in
his choice of servant must be determined from the nature
of his duties and the character of the instrumentalities
within his control.2 9 Unless the instrumentality is in some
way inherently dangerous, the degree of care to which the
master will be held is that of reasonable care.3 0 Since the
defendant, under the circumstances, appears to have acted
reasonably in placing the sergeant in this position, and the
Court's opinion said nothing to the contrary, it seems the
Court did not base its holding upon this reasoning.
In Joel v. Morrison,8' 1 the correct rule was announced
that if the servant is on a "frolic" of his own, without being
at all on his master's business, unless there is some justifi-
able reliance on the part of the third person dealing with
the servant on the agency relationship, there will be no
imputing of the negligence of the servant to the master.
If the master is to be held on the ground that he is pri-
marily negligent, the correct rule requires a violation of
his duty of care to those dealing with the servant must
be shown.2 Neither rule is satisfied in the instant case.
DAVID H. CLARK
329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W. 2d 382 (1951).T Id., 384.
2 Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922).
2 MEcHrnm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1954), p. 1512.
3D Ibid.
6 0. & P. 501 [1834].
Supra, n. 24.
